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Evaluation of projects that affect mortality risk usually assumes that risk changes are 
small and similar across individuals. In reality, risks differ among individuals and information 
about risk heterogeneity determines the extent to which affected lives are “statistical” or 
“identified” and influences the outcome of benefit-cost analysis (BCA). The effects of 
information about risk heterogeneity on BCA depend on, inter alia, whether information 
concerns heterogeneity of baseline or change in risk and whether valuation uses compensating or 
equivalent variation. BCA does not systematically favor identified over statistical lives. We 
suggest some political factors that may explain the apparent public bias. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern societies seem to spend more generously to save the lives of identified than 
anonymous victims (Viscusi, 2000a; Lamm, 2001; Richardson and McKie, 2003, Hsu, 2007), a 
phenomenon that has been described as “statistical murder.”
1 Spending large amounts to benefit 
only a few may be inefficient. It may also be inequitable: the question arises why some receive 
particular attention and not others. A bias toward identified lives can drive priorities in risk 
management including the choice between prevention and treatment of injury or disease (Corso et 
al., 2002) and the allocation of efforts among risks, e.g., treating kidney-disease patients or 
preventing traffic crashes, building nuclear or coal-fired power plants. From a broader 
perspective, information about whom a policy affects may influence the chance that it will be 
adopted. This effect may be particularly important for health and safety policies and for the 
valuation of health and mortality risk.  
The economic literature on the “value of life” has from the beginning distinguished 
between identified and statistical lives. In the first paragraph of his seminal paper, Schelling 
(1968) writes “It is not the worth of human life that I shall discuss, but of ‘life-saving,’ of 
preventing death. And it is not a particular death, but a statistical death.” Economists have since 
been cautious to make clear that the standard valuation approach – purposely labeled the “value 
of statistical life” (VSL) approach – applies only when changes in risk are small and similar 
among the affected population.
2 As Viscusi (1992: 17) states, “This need to think in terms of 
statistical lives as opposed to certain lives defines the main character of our choice problem.” 
The focus on statistical rather than identified lives is consistent with the traditional marginal 
approach to the valuation of public goods (Samuelson, 1954; Bergstrom, 1982) and lessens the 
scope for psychological concerns in the usual case where the effects of a policy on individual 
mortality risks are small (Schelling, 1968).  
                                                 
1 In her paper “Murdering Statistical Lives …?” Linnerooth (1982: 231) attributes the provocative 
term to Howard Raiffa. It was subsequently used by Graham (1995) and Viscusi (2000b). Tal 
(1998: 170) cites an alternative use by Merrell and Van Strum (1990: 21) to describe the 
permitting of any activity (e.g., pesticide use) that imposes mortality risk on someone. 
2 Howard (1984) proposed valuing risk increments in terms of “micromorts,” i.e., risk changes of 
one in a million. This alternative term emphasizes the focus on small risk changes. Equivalent 
terms include value of statistical life (Viscusi, 1992), value per statistical life (Hammitt, 2000), 
value per life saved (Jones-Lee, 1976), and value of prevented fatality (Jones-Lee, 2004).   2
The focus on statistical lives leaves open the question of how to evaluate a project that 
may save, or threaten, the lives of identified people. One may judge that the VSL approach is 
inappropriate when changes in individual risks are large. But what should one do instead? 
Scholars have recognized that identified and statistical lives are not the same (Schelling, 1968; 
Mishan, 1971; Weinstein et al., 1980; Keeney, 1995; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1996)
3 but how this 
difference should affect societal decisions is less clear.  
Societies may choose to protect individual over statistical lives to support principles of 
respect for individuals and compassion (Zeckhauser, 1975; Tal, 1998). Decisions that are seen to 
protect identified victims have the merit of endorsing social values of compassion, solidarity, and 
unwillingness to sacrifice the few for the benefit of the many. In making this choice, societies 
must determine when the gains in equity, symbolism, and other objectives outweigh the loss in 
efficiency (Okun, 1975; Linnerooth, 1982). Differences between ex ante and ex post 
identifiability may have implications for decision making. Ex ante identifiability may attract 
public attention and invoke a “rule of rescue” response (Richardson and McKie, 2003). Ex post 
identifiability may be required to attribute deaths to particular decisions and to hold decision 
makers accountable (Raiffa et al., 1977). 
The distinction between identified and statistical lives is not sharp but a continuum 
characterized by available information about heterogeneity of risk. People are neither identical 
nor anonymous and neither baseline risks nor policy-induced changes in risk are always small or 
identical across people. In general, baseline risks and risk changes differ among individuals 
because of differences in exposure (e.g., to sources of pollution, traffic conditions) and 
differences in susceptibility (e.g., related to age, sex, health status, genetics, behavior). In 
practice, information about how risks and policy-induced changes in risk differ among 
individuals varies among cases. Often information is so limited that one has little choice but to 
treat the risks as identical. Individuals may be conceived as facing a compound lottery. In the first 
stage, their baseline risk and policy-induced risk change are drawn from the population 
distribution and in the second stage the outcome of the mortality risk is realized. Before 
information about the outcome of the first stage is available, risks are identical across individuals 
                                                 
3 In particular, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) examine the effects of risk and wealth on optimal 
public safety expenditures defined behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance (before individuals have 
information about their own wealth and risk). Linnerooth (1982) and Hammitt (2002) compare 
VSL with effectiveness measures such as lives and life years saved.    3
and the lives at risk are “statistical.” If the outcome of the first stage is known and heterogeneity 
of risk is large, then the lives at risk are “identified.” Hence the identifiability of individuals at 
risk may be characterized by the quality of information about the heterogeneity of risk in the 
population.  
The objective of this paper is to examine how information about heterogeneity of baseline 
risk and of policy-induced changes in risk influences economic valuation. This objective can be 
efficiently studied using the standard one-period model. Specifically, we investigate how the 
results of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) depend on information about heterogeneity of individual 
risks and risk changes in the conventional static VSL model. We compare these results with 
maximization of social welfare, defined as the mean of individuals’ expected utilities (Harsanyi, 
1953, 1955). This measure of social welfare is independent of information about risk 
heterogeneity when, as in our analysis, people are otherwise identical.
4  
We show that information about risk heterogeneity has, in many cases, a predictable effect 
on the outcome of BCA. In the usual case in which one aggregates individuals’ willingness to pay 
for a project that reduces risk, information about heterogeneity of risk change decreases the value 
of the project. This result contrasts with the “identifiability bias” or the “identifiable-victim 
effect” that has been discussed in the literature in psychological and behavioral law and policy 
(e.g., Small and Lowenstein, 2003; Hsu, 2007).  
Our analysis confronts a well-known conceptual issue, “Broome’s paradox.”
5 Consider a 
project that is anticipated to kill one person from a population of similar individuals (e.g., the 
project may put construction workers at risk). It may be that if the identity of the one who would 
die were unknown the project would pass a net-benefit test and be adopted. Yet if this person’s 
identity were known he might require infinite compensation for the loss of his life and the project 
would fail the net-benefit test and be rejected. This is a paradox in the sense that the only 
difference between the two situations is knowing the identity of the person who will die, and this 
                                                 
4 Another critical source of heterogeneity is wealth. The effects of wealth heterogeneity are 
beyond the scope of this paper. We concentrate on the issue announced in the title, which 
motivates the focus on heterogeneity of risk.  
5 Broome’s (1978) provocative paper raises a number of issues for BCA. Many of these issues are 
addressed in a set of critical papers (Buchanan and Faith, 1979; Jones-Lee, 1979; Williams, 
1979). On the issue of interest to this paper, Ulph (1982) suggests that Broome’s paradox arises 
due to an inappropriate social welfare function, i.e., a utilitarian framework. Our discussion 
differs from Ulph’s since we work within a utilitarian framework.    4
it may be argued (Broome, 1978) should not ultimately affect the social decision rule.
6 Broome’s 
paradox is a useful starting point for our analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple 
example based on Broome’s paradox that highlights the effect of information about heterogeneity 
of policy-induced changes in mortality risk on BCA. In Section 3, we review the standard model 
of value per statistical life. Using that model, we examine in Section 4 how information about the 
heterogeneity of policy-induced changes in mortality risk affects each of the four measures of 
economic valuation: compensating and equivalent variations for reductions and increases in 
mortality risk. We find that the effect of more information about the heterogeneity of changes in 
risk (i.e., greater identifiability of the individuals who are benefited or harmed by a project) 
depends on whether the project is evaluated using compensating or equivalent variations. Using 
compensating variation, more information decreases WTP for risk reductions and increases WTA 
for risk increases, thereby decreasing the net benefits of the project. In contrast, using equivalent 
variation, more information increases WTA to forgo the project and decreases WTP to prevent 
the project, increasing the net benefits of the project. In Section 5, we examine the effects of 
information about heterogeneity of baseline risk. In contrast to the results for changes in risk, the 
effects of information about baseline risk are in general ambiguous.  
Finding no systematic effect in the standard VSL model that can explain the apparent 
public preference for protecting identified lives, we consider other potential explanations. In 
Section 6, we show that altruism, defined as concern for others’ well-being, does not in general 
justify a special concern with identified lives. In Section 7, we consider several political factors 
that may explain the identified-victim effect: legal responsibility or empathy for identified 
individuals or groups, more effective lobbying by small groups with concentrated interests, and 
political demagogy that appeals to voters’ concern for identified lives, which may be influenced 
by availability or other cognitive heuristics. We conclude with a discussion of the policy 
implications of our analysis, which include identification of strategic motives for generation or 
                                                 
6 Broome (1978) presents another version of the paradox based on the timing of decisions: 
Suppose information about who will die is not available today but will be available tomorrow. If 
the project is up for consideration today, it may be acceptable, but tomorrow it will be deemed 
unacceptable by an infinite margin. Hence re-evaluating the project one day later would lead to 
rejecting it as “infinitely wrong.” Similarly, Heinzerling (2000) argues that the evaluation of 
projects that affect mortality risks should not depend on whether the lives at risk are identifiable.    5
disclosure of information about risk heterogeneity, implications for the intertemporal consistency 
of BCA, and discussion of whether cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) using life years saved or 
other effectiveness measures may be more consistent than BCA with maximization of social 
welfare. 
2. A Paradox of Benefit-Cost Analysis? 
We begin with a simple example that illustrates how the outcome of a BCA depends on 
information about heterogeneity of a policy-induced change in risk. Consider an economy with 
two people, H and L. Each has initial wealth w and probability  p  of surviving the single period 
we consider. Each is risk-neutral in wealth and has no bequest motive (i.e., the utility of wealth 
conditional on death is zero). Hence each individual has expected utility (EU)  
EU = pw.           ( 1 )  
Consider a project that will impose mortality risk on both people. The average 
incremental mortality risk is e. The monetary benefit of the project to each person is s. If people 
do not know their individual incremental risks (or if the incremental risks are identical) then each 
has expected utility 
EU/no info  () () p ews =− + .         ( 2 )  
Defining social welfare as the mean of the two individuals’ expected utilities (Harsanyi, 1953, 
1955), social welfare is also given by eqn. (2).  
Now consider the effect of information about individual risks. For simplicity, assume H 
(high) faces incremental risk 2e and L (low) faces no incremental risk. Social welfare given 
information is 
EU/info = 0.5( 2 )( ) 0.5 ( ) ( )( ) p ews p ws pews −+ + + = − + .  (3) 
Social welfare with information is the same as in the no-information case. In this example, 
information about individual changes in risk does not affect social welfare, as Broome (1978) 
suggests. Moreover, observe that the project will enhance social welfare if and only if 
() () p ews p w −+ > .          ( 4 )  
Consider how BCA would handle the situation. BCA involves comparing the monetary 
values of social benefits and costs. The per-capita benefit is s. The costs are the total   6
compensation required to induce the people to accept the mortality risks. The compensating 
variation to accept a risk x,  () Cx, is defined by
7 
[ ] () ( ) p xwC x p w −+ = ,         ( 5 )  
which implies 
() / ( ) Cx x w p x =− .          ( 6 )  
In the case without information about individual risks, the per-capita cost is 
C/no info =  /( ) ew p e − .         ( 7 )  
With information about individual risks, the per-capita cost is 
C/info = 0.5[2 /( 2 )] 0.5[0] /( 2 ) e w pe e w pe −+ = − .     (8) 
Since C/info > C/no info, the decision recommended by BCA may depend on whether or not the 
individual risks are known.
8 Specifically, if 
C/no info < s < C/info, i.e.,  /( ) /( 2 ) ew p e s ew p e − << − ,      (9) 
then BCA will suggest the project should proceed if there is no information about individual risks 
but should be rejected if individual risks are known. 
Another approach to BCA is to ask if there is any lump-sum transfer  y  such that the 
project with transfer is Pareto superior to rejection of the project. In the present case with 
information, the question is whether there is an amount  y  that could be transferred from L to H 
such that H prefers to adopt the project, i.e., 
(2 ) ( ) p ews y pw −+ + > ,         ( 1 0 )  
and L prefers to adopt the project, i.e., 
() p wsy pw +− > .          ( 1 1 )  
Eqn. (11) implies that  y s < , i.e., L cannot provide compensation greater than s  if he is to prefer 
the project with transfer to its absence. So the maximum expected utility of H cannot exceed that 
                                                 
7 Alternatively, we could consider terminal wealth with the project, ws + , and obtain net 
compensating variation,  () Cx s − . 
8 Eqn. (7) demonstrates that the required compensation could be infinite for ep = , as Broome 
(1978) suggests. The example shows that this extreme case is not required to induce the type of 
paradox proposed by Broome.    7
obtained when  ys = . It is clear that eqn. (10) may not be satisfied since the survival probability 
(2 ) p e −  can be arbitrarily close (or equal) to zero and so with finite s the inequality is violated.
9  
How is it possible that information about individual risk has no effect on social welfare 
but may determine whether the project is adopted? The BCA criterion aggregates the monetary 
values of welfare gains and losses across people. The relationship between survival probability 
and the monetary value of utility increments can be highly non-linear. In our example, as survival 
probability approaches zero the monetary value of a unit of utility approaches infinity. In 
contrast, the expected-utility criterion aggregates increments of expected utility, which are linear 
in probability. Measuring in utility units, changes in individual risk (holding population risk 
constant) and information about individual risk have no effect on social welfare (when 
individuals are otherwise identical). Measuring in monetary units, information may have a large 
effect since the monetary value of the harm increases more rapidly for the person whose risk is 
increased than it decreases for the person whose risk is decreased (i.e., the indifference curve for 
wealth and risk and the compensation function for risk are both convex, as will be shown below). 
This example illustrates a well known point: adding compensation is not the same as 
adding utility.
10 If one wishes to use monetary compensation as an accurate proxy for adding 
                                                 
9 Note that if one wishes to maximize social welfare it is optimal to transfer all the benefits of the 
project to the person with higher survival probability. That is, the maximum of 
( 2 )( ) ( ) p e wsy p wsy −+ + + + − is obtained for  ys = − . Since there is assumed to be no bequest 
motive, any wealth given to a person who dies contributes no well-being to the society. This 
shows that social welfare can be made higher under information about individual risks than under 
no information. In contrast, BCA can lead to the recommendation to adopt the welfare-enhancing 
project only in the no-information case. Information may have a negative welfare effect for a 
society that uses BCA as its decision rule. Suppose the condition in eqn. (9) holds. Then if 
society evaluates the project using BCA, information would lead it to reject the project. Without 
information, the project would be accepted and social welfare would increase.  
10 See, e.g., Blackorby and Donaldson (1990), Johansson (1998), and in the context of mortality 
risk, Armantier and Treich (2004). Linerooth (1982) suggests that the higher VSL of individuals 
facing larger mortality risk is not sufficient justification for disproportionately allocating public 
resources to protect them. Although the private opportunity cost of spending is low for such 
individuals (by the dead-anyway effect described in Section 3), the social opportunity cost is not. 
Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) propose adjusting empirical estimates of VSL to account for 
differences between private and social opportunity costs of spending associated with 
heterogeneity of mortality risk.   8
utility, one must adjust for differences in the marginal utility of consumption between people.
11 It 
is well known that adding unweighted compensation is valid in a first-best economy in which a 
social planner is able to implement lump-sum transfers to equalize marginal utility of 
consumption across people (Samuelson, 1954). But it is also well known that implementing 
optimal lump-sum transfers, or weighting compensation by the inverse of the marginal utility of 
consumption, confronts the problem of non-observability of utility which BCA avoids by seeking 
to determine only whether a proposed change is a potential Pareto improvement (i.e., satisfies a 
Kaldor-Hicks compensation test). 
The logical point conveyed by the example is that without information individuals are 
identical and there is no need to weight their compensation for any difference in marginal 
utilities. In this case, the unweighted sum of compensation is a correct indicator of social welfare. 
This is not true with information about differences in individual risks. Indeed, with information 
the situation is asymmetric and marginal utilities may differ between individuals. Hence, whether 
lives are statistical or identified may affect economic valuation. In the remainder of the paper, we 
study the effects of individual-specific information about risks on the outcome of BCA, i.e., on 
the sum of unweighted individual compensation. 
3. The Value-of-Statistical-Life Model 
In the standard single-period value-of-statistical-life (VSL) model, the individual 
maximizes his (state-dependent) expected indirect utility given by 
V= ()( 1 ) () puw pvw +−         ( 1 2 )  
where  p  is the probability of surviving the period,  () u ⋅  is the utility of wealth if he survives the 
period, and  () v ⋅  is the utility of wealth if he dies (e.g., the utility of a bequest). This model was 
                                                 
11 When individual costs are weighted by the individual marginal utilities of wealth, per-capita 
cost is independent of information about risk heterogeneity. Without information, the marginal 
utility of wealth is () p e −  for both individuals; with information, the marginal utility of wealth is 
() 2 p e −  for H and  p  for L. With and without information, per-capita weighted cost equals ew. 
If the marginal utility of the bequest is equal to the marginal utility of wealth given survival, then 
the expected marginal utility is independent of risk and the monetary compensation is linear in 
the incremental risk (e.g., let the utility if dead equal w β −  instead of zero). In this case, 
maximization of social welfare and maximization of the sum of unweighted monetary 
compensation lead to the same outcome.    9
introduced by Drèze (1962)
12 and Jones-Lee (1974) and has been commonly used in the VSL 
literature (e.g., Hammitt, 2000; Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).  
We adopt the standard assumptions that u  and v are twice differentiable with 
uv > ,  '' 0 uv >≥ ,  '' 0 u ≤ , and  '' 0 v ≤ .         ( 1 3 )  
That is, state-dependent utilities are increasing and weakly concave. At any wealth level both 
utility and marginal utility are larger if alive than dead. Under the standard assumptions (13), 
indifference curves over (,) wp are decreasing and strictly convex as illustrated in Figure 1. 
VSL is the marginal rate of substitution between wealth and survival probability, i.e., (the 
negative of) the slope of the indifference curve at (,) wp. It is defined by 
() ()
VSL 0
'( ) (1 ) '( )
dw u w v w




.       ( 1 4 )  
Note that VSL may vary across individuals since it depends on w,  p , and on the shape of the 
utility function through u  and v.  
In the next section, we study compensating and equivalent variations in wealth for 
increases and decreases in risk. To first-order, these variations can be approximated by the 
product of VSL and the change in risk dp.
13 Since VSL is a marginal rate of substitution it does 
not capture heterogeneity in risk change. VSL provides a good approximation to an individual’s 
monetary compensation for a change in risk only when the change is sufficiently small. At the 
population level, average VSL provides a good approximation to the social value of a change in 
population risk if all risk changes in the population are small.
14 A formally equivalent situation is 
                                                 
12 Published in French, Drèze’s paper is not well known among Anglophone economists although 
it was discussed by Jones-Lee (1974, 1976). Drèze modeled individual WTP to eliminate a one-
time mortality risk and optimal spending on risk reduction using the now-standard state-
dependent utility function (12). 
13 Formally, VSL is equal to the marginal compensating and equivalent variations  '(0) C ,  '(0) P , 
'(0) n C , and  '(0) n P , that are defined below in eqns. (16), (18), (20) and (23), respectively. Jones-
Lee (1976) also evaluated these four measures of value. 
14 The term value per statistical life may be motivated by noting that if a population of N  
individuals would each pay on average dw for a small risk reduction dp, a total of Ndw would 
be paid to prevent Ndp  expected fatalities.   10
that of a few individuals facing a large change in risk when these individuals are anonymous (to 
themselves and to others).
15  
The expression for VSL in eqn. (14) is useful for identifying two effects that will be 
important for our analysis. First, the dead-anyway effect (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1996) describes 
how VSL increases with risk, i.e., decreases with survival probability  p  (i.e.,  VSL/ 0 p ∂∂ < ). In 
Figure 1, the indifference curve is steeper at B than at A. Intuitively, an individual facing a large 
total probability of death has little incentive to limit his spending on risk reduction since he is 
unlikely to survive and have other opportunities for consumption. In eqn. (14), the value of the 
numerator is independent of  p  and a decrease in  p  reduces the value of the denominator (since 
'' uv > ).
16 Second, the wealth effect describes how VSL increases with wealth w, i.e., 
VSL/ 0 w ∂∂ >  and the indifference curve in Figure 1 is steeper at C than at A. The intuition for 
the wealth effect is two-fold. First, wealthier people have more to loose if they die (i.e., the 
numerator in eqn. (14) increases with w because  ' ' uv > ). Second, the utility cost of spending is 
smaller (or no larger) due to weakly diminishing marginal utility (risk aversion) with respect to 
wealth (i.e., the denominator in eqn. (14) does not increase because  '' 0 u ≤  and  '' 0 v ≤ ). Hence, 
VSL increases as one moves upward and leftward along an indifference curve and the 
indifference curves are convex. In Figure 1, VSL at D is greater than VSL at A because of both 
the dead-anyway and the wealth effects.  
                                                 
15 Identifiability may impair rational decision making when the threat of death is present. This is 
recognized by Schelling (1968): “The avoidance of a particular death – the death of a named 
individual– cannot be treated straightforwardly as a consumer choice. It involves anxiety and 
sentiment, guilt and awe, responsibility and religion. If the individuals are identified, there are 
many of us who cannot even answer whether one should die that two may live.” We abstract 
from this issue but recognize it may play an important role for practical BCA, e.g. for elicitation 
of individual WTP in surveys. Observe however that opposite arguments may be used with 
statistical lives due to the small probabilities involved, like the insensitivity of WTP to 
probabilities (Hammitt and Graham, 1999). 
16 The dead-anyway effect was recognized by Jones-Lee (1974, 1976), Weinstein et al. (1980), 
Linerooth (1982), and others but the moniker was bestowed by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996). It 
depends on  ' ' uv > , a condition that may not hold with perfect contingent-claims markets (Jones-
Lee, 1976; Weinstein et al., 1980; Breyer and Felder, 2005) or when desired bequests are 
constrained because human capital or other components of wealth do not  survive the individual’s 
death (Breyer and Felder, 2005).    11
4. Information about Heterogeneous Changes in Risk  
The example in Section 2 shows that information about risk heterogeneity can affect a 
policy decision that is based on BCA. The strength of the effect depends on the non-linearity of 
the compensation function  () / ( ) Cx x w p x =−  (eqn. (6)). The crucial property is the convexity of 
this function, which we now demonstrate.  
Consider two individual-specific risk increments,  1 x  and  2 x . In the absence of 
information about individual-specific risk, each individual faces an expected risk increment of 
12 0.5 0.5 x xx =+ and requires compensation  () Cx (see Figure 2). Under perfect information, 
each knows his specific incremental risk and average compensation is  12 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) Cx Cx + . 
Information increases average compensation iff  12 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) ( ) Cx Cx Cx + ≥ , i.e., when  () Cx is 
convex. Clearly, convexity of the compensation function is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for information about individual-specific risk changes to increase average compensation for any 
distribution of individual-specific risk changes in the economy (holding the average risk change 
fixed). Moreover, convexity of the indifference curves over (,) wp implies that  () Cxis convex. 
Analyzing the convexity of C  is equivalent to comparing the compensation required for 
successive risk increments. Compare the compensation required for an incremental risk increase 
of x to the compensation required for a second equal increment x once the first has been made. 
Convexity implies that compensation for the second increment is larger than for the first. There 
are two differences in the compensation for the second unit compared with the first: i) survival 
probability is lower,  p x −  compared with  p ; and ii) wealth is higher,  () wC x +  compared with 
w. The first difference increases compensation through the dead-anyway effect and the second 
increases compensation through the wealth effect.  
In the remainder of this section we use the standard VSL model (14) to study how 
information affects the valuation of changes in risk. As we have just seen, this amounts to 
studying the convexity of the compensation functions for changes in risk. We consider the 
valuation of both increases and decreases in risk, using both WTA and WTP. We find that the 
conclusions differ in each case.   12
4.1 WTA for implementing a risk-increasing project 
Generalizing the introductory example, we first consider WTA for a risk-increasing 
project. Let  () Cx be the WTA (compensating variation) defined by 
() ( ( ) ) ( 1 ) ( ( ) )( ) ( 1 ) ( ) p xuw Cx p xvw Cx p uw pvw −++ − ++=+ −    (15) 
with 0 x p ≤≤. Differentiating with respect to x gives 
(( ) ) (( ) )
'( ) 0
( )' ( () ) ( 1 )' ( () )
uw Cx vw Cx
Cx
p xuw Cx p xvw Cx
+− +
=>
−+ + − ++
.    (16) 
Differentiating once again with respect to x gives, under our assumptions on u  and v,  '' 0 C > . 
As noted above, the convexity of C  is immediate from the convexity of the indifference curve. 
Indeed, we have  [ ] 12 () 0 . 5 () ( ) Cx Cx Cx <+  (see Figure 2). Since WTA is convex in risk 
increments it increases with information about individual risk changes. This is due to the dead-
anyway effect and the wealth effect, both of which are positive in this case, as shown above.  
This case shows that information about individual risk changes increases the cost of the 
risk-increasing project and induces a bias in favor of the status quo. With more information, a 
project that would have been accepted may be rejected, preventing an increase in mortality risks 
in the economy. This is the case illustrated by Broome’s (1978) paradox.  
4.2 WTP for implementing a risk-decreasing project 
Let ( ) Px be the WTP (compensating variation) for implementing a risk-decreasing 
project defined by 
() (( ) ) ( 1 ) (( ) )( ) ( 1 ) ( ) p x u wP x px v wP x p u w p v w +− + − −−=+ −    (17) 
with 01 x p ≤≤ −. Differentiating with respect to x gives 
( ( )) ( ( ))
'( ) 0
( ) '( ( )) (1 ) '( ( ))
uw Px vw Px
Px
p xu w Px p xv w Px
−− −
=>
+− + − −−
.    (18) 
Differentiating once again with respect to  x gives '' 0 P < . Observe from Figure 2 that this result 
is immediate from the convexity of the indifference curve, i.e.,  [ ] 12 () 0 . 5 () ( ) P xP x P x >+ . WTP 
is concave in risk reductions and thus decreases with information about individual risk changes. 
Both the dead-anyway and wealth effects are negative in this case.  
This case shows that more information decreases the benefit of the risk-decreasing project 
and, like the previous case, induces a bias in favor of the status quo. More information may lead   13
to rejecting a project that would have been accepted, forgoing an opportunity to reduce mortality 
risks in the economy.  
Combining the results from Sections 4.1 and 4.2 implies that more information about risk 
heterogeneity has a predictable effect on BCA. When using compensating variation (i.e., WTP to 
reduce risk and WTA compensation for a risk increase), more information about risk 
heterogeneity decreases the benefits and increase the costs, and hence discourages adoption, of a 
project that decreases risk to some and increases risk to other members of the economy.
17 
4.3 WTA for not implementing a risk-decreasing project 
Let ( ) n Cx  be the WTA (equivalent variation) for forgoing a risk-decreasing project 
defined by 
( () ) ( 1 )( () ) ( )() ( 1 )() nn puw C x pvw C x p xuw p xvw ++ −+= ++ − − (19) 
with 01 x p ≤≤ −. Differentiating with respect to x gives 
() ()
'( ) 0









.     (20) 
Differentiating once again with respect to  x gives 
2 ( '( )) [ ''( ( )) (1 ) ''( ( ))]
''( )
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.   (21) 
Under our assumptions on u  and v, '' 0 n C ≥ . WTA is convex and thus increases with 
information. In Figure 2,  [] 12 () 0 . 5 () ( ) nn n Cx Cx Cx ≤+ . Observe that under risk neutrality (i.e., 
'' '' 0 uv == ),  n C  is linear and there is no effect of information. Under strict risk aversion (i.e., 
'' 0 u <  and  '' 0 v < ), the dead-anyway effect is negative and the wealth effect is positive, 
suggesting that the latter effect dominates. Note that it is not possible a priori to determine the 
convexity of  n C  from Figure 2.  
This case shows that more information increases the benefit of the risk-decreasing project 
and induces a bias in favor of the status quo (implementing the project). In this case, more 
                                                 
17 Note that the results rely on only the convexity of the indifference curves and that the 
conditions exhibited in (13) are sufficient, but not necessary, for this convexity property to hold. 
This suggests broader applications of the results than to pure mortality risks.   14
information may lead to adopting a project that would have been rejected, reducing mortality 
risks in the economy. 
4.4 WTP for not implementing a risk-increasing project 
Let  () n Px be the WTP (equivalent variation) to prevent implementing a risk-increasing 
project defined by 
( () ) ( 1 )( () ) ( )() ( 1 )() nn puw P x pvw P x p xuw p xvw −+ −−= − + − +    (22) 
with 0 x p ≤≤. Differentiating with respect to x gives 
() ()
'( ) 0









.     (23) 
Differentiating once again with respect to  x gives 
2 ( '( )) [ ''( ( )) (1 ) ''( ( ))]
''( )
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.    (24) 
Under our assumptions on u  and v,  '' 0 n P ≤ . WTP is concave and decreases with information. In 
Figure 2,  [] 12 () 0 . 5 () ( ) nn n Px Px Px ≥+ . Note that, as for the previous case, there is no effect under 
risk neutrality and under strict risk aversion the wealth effect (which is negative) dominates the 
dead-anyway effect (which is positive). Note again that it is not possible a priori to infer the sign 
of the second derivative of  n P  from Figure 2. 
This case shows that more information decreases the cost of the risk-increasing project 
and induces a bias in favor of the status quo (implementing the policy). More information may 
lead to adopting a project that would have been rejected and thus increase mortality risks in the 
economy. 
Combining results from Sections 4.3 and 4.4 implies that when BCA is conducted using 
equivalent variation measures (i.e., WTA to forgo a risk reduction, WTP to prevent a risk 
increase), information about risk heterogeneity increases WTA, decreases WTP, and discourages 
abandonment of a project that decreases risk to some and increases risk to others. 
5. Information about Heterogeneous Baseline Risks 
In Section 4, the initial risk is common across individuals although the risk changes can 
differ. In this section we consider how information about heterogeneity of baseline risk can affect   15
valuation. We begin with a problem first analyzed by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) on the 
concentration of risk in a community, in which the baseline risk and risk change are perfectly 
correlated in the population. We then consider a simpler problem in which baseline risk is 
heterogeneous but the policy-induced risk change is common across the population. We restrict 
our analysis to compensating variation (WTP for a risk reduction, WTA for a risk increase) and 
find that the effect of information is generally ambiguous when individuals are risk averse. 
5.1 Heterogeneity in both change and baseline risk 
Suppose there are  N  people in the economy each with initial wealth w. Only RN ≤  
people are at risk and of these R  people dR ≤  will die. None of the NR −  others will die. A 
reduction in R  may be interpreted as both a change in the concentration of risk in the population 
and as a change in individual-specific information in the economy.  
We return to the simplest possible assumptions as in our initial example, i.e.,  () uz z =  




NR wR w Nd w
R
−
−+ = −.        ( 2 5 )  
Observe that social welfare is independent of R . Suppose that a risk-reducing project will save n 
lives () nd ≤  for a given per-capita cost F . The net effect of the project on social welfare is also 
independent of R .  
Let us now look at how BCA would handle the situation. Let  () PR be the WTP 














.          ( 2 7 )  
Both individual WTP  () PR and total benefits  () RPR are decreasing in R . Information about 
risk heterogeneity affects the outcome of BCA but not social welfare.  
Note the direction of the bias: the monetary value of the benefit of the project is larger 
when the number of people who are identified as at risk is smaller, i.e., a “benefit-concentration”   16
effect. This result is opposite the one obtained in Section 4.2 where aggregate WTP decreases 
with information about individual risk reductions. Here information about which people face 
larger risk reductions increases aggregate WTP. Better information about individual-specific risks 
may lead to adopting a project that would otherwise be rejected, decreasing mortality risk in the 
economy. 
Alternatively, we can evaluate WTA (compensating variation) for a risk-increasing 
project. Suppose that a risk-increasing project will kill r  people in this economy ( ) rRd ≤−  for 














.          ( 2 9 )  
Individual WTA denoted  () CR decreases with R  as does the total social cost  () RCR. In this 
case, better information as to which people face additional risk increases aggregate WTA. Better 
information may lead to rejecting a project that would otherwise be accepted, preventing an 
increase in mortality risk as in Broome’s (1978) paradox.  
To summarize, under risk neutrality with respect to wealth, more information about the 
concentration of risk and risk change can lead to lower mortality risks in the economy. This can 
occur through either of two pathways: adopting risk-reducing projects that would be rejected and 
rejecting risk-increasing projects that would be adopted with poorer information about the 
concentration of risks and benefits. 
What is the effect of a change in R  in a model with risk aversion? Consider the following 
example. Take the utility function 
()  a n d   () 0 uz z vz ==           ( 3 0 )  
together with the following set of parameter values:  1 w = ,  50 d = , and  20 n = . It is 









⎡⎤ −− ⎛⎞ =− = ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ −+ − ⎝⎠ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
      ( 3 1 )  
so that  () RPR is increasing over  [50,60] R∈  and decreasing over  60 R > . In this case 
information about how many people are at risk has an ambiguous effect on aggregate WTP.    17
The non-monotonicity of  () RPR reflects the competition between two effects: as R  
decreases, fewer people will pay but each is willing to pay more. This example proves that is not 
possible a priori to determine which effect dominates under risk-averse preferences, as 
previously shown by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996: 753). 
5.2 Heterogeneity in baseline risk 
The previous result suggests that the effect of information about the concentration of risk 
in an economy is more difficult to sign than the effect of information about differences in risk 
changes analyzed in Section 4. This can be easily understood. In the case of information about 
which people are at risk there are not one but two sources of individual-specific risks: risk over 
the baseline probability and risk over the change in probability. In the cases considered in Section 
5.1, these risks are perfectly positively correlated. 
We next consider the simpler problem of analyzing the effect of information about only 
heterogenous baseline risks. Assume that people have different survival probabilities  p  but the 
risk reduction x is the same for everyone. We can show that information about baseline risks has 
an ambiguous effect in this case as well. Take the same risk-averse utility function as in (30). 











.          ( 3 2 )  
From Section 4.2 it is easy to understand that the convexity of  () Pp in  p  determines the 
effect of information about baseline probability on aggregate WTP. Yet from eqn. (32) the sign of 
this effect is ambiguous as the sign of  ''( ) Pp  depends on the sign of ( ) /2 px − . Hence the effect 
of more information about heterogeneous baseline risk depends on the values of  p  and x. 
Again, it is easy to see that this ambiguity disappears under risk-neutrality, in the sense that more 
information about baseline probabilities increases aggregate WTP and aggregate WTA for all 
values of  , p x and w. 
In contrast to the effects of information about heterogeneity of risk reduction analyzed in 
Section 4, this section shows that the effects of information about heterogeneity in baseline risk 
on the value of risk changes are in general ambiguous. This ambiguity results when differences in 
risk changes are perfectly correlated with differences in baseline risk and also when risk changes   18
are common across individuals. An exception occurs for the case of risk neutrality with respect to 
wealth where information about either risk concentration or heterogeneous baseline risks 
increases both aggregate WTP for a risk-reducing program and aggregate WTA for a risk-
increasing program. 
6. Altruism and the Identifiable-Victim Effect 
In this section, we briefly discuss the effect of altruism. Concern for others’ well being is 
an important and natural concern in the matter of saving lives. Moreover, it is widely believed 
that there is an “identifiable-victim effect”: people are willing to pay more to save the lives of 
others when these lives are easily identifiable than when they are statistical (see, e.g., Jenni and 
Loewenstein, 1997; Heinzerling, 2000; Small and Loewenstein, 2003). Typically, there is an 
empathic response to rescuing identified people (or animals) in precarious circumstances. There 
is little hope of capturing all the channels underlying such empathic responses in a simple 
economic model (recall the quote from Schelling (1968) in footnote 15). In any case, our 
previous model did not have a chance to do so since there was no consideration of altruism.
18  
We consider only the case of pure altruism.
19 It has been shown that pure altruism may be 
ignored in BCA. The sum of private compensating variations is indeed an adequate estimate of 
the benefits of the project in the sense that if this sum exceeds the sum of the private costs of the 
project, then the project is a potential Pareto improvement for altruistic people. This point was 
first stressed by Bergstrom (1982), elaborated by Jones-Lee (1992), and generalized by 
Bergstrom (2006). The argument is simple. A pure altruist benefits when the project reduces 
another person’s risk but is harmed when the project imposes costs on the other person. The sign 
of one person’s altruistic valuation for another is the same as the sign of the net private benefits 
to the other and so pure altruism cannot alter the sign of the social net benefits.  
                                                 
18 In model (12), a natural interpretation of the utility function v(·) is as a bequest function. This 
may be viewed as a form of altruism, e.g., toward one’s children. But this is not the form of 
altruism that is important here. We study altruistic preferences over other people’s mortality 
risks.  
19 See Jones-Lee (1992) for an analysis of the implications of both pure (i.e., benevolent, non-
paternalistic) and paternalistic altruism (e.g., safety-focused altruism) for the valuation of life.    19
The implication of this observation is that pure altruism should not affect the valuation of 
lives in BCA, no matter how much information is available about risk heterogeneity, and hence 
pure altruism cannot justify an identifiable-victim effect.  
7. Policy Implications 
A standard economic result is that public projects with positive expected financial returns 
should be adopted (Arrow and Lind, 1970), no matter how risk averse are individuals. This 
conclusion assumes an economy with either complete markets or a large number of individuals 
who can share financial risks. In this economy, the sum of individual compensating variations for 
a project is consistent with the maximization of social welfare, with or without information on the 
distribution of the project’s effects among individuals, because complete markets for risk-sharing 
yield an efficient outcome at which individuals equate their marginal utilities. When risk-sharing 
opportunities are limited, the rule of acceptance for public projects is less clear and the adequacy 
of BCA as a method for identifying gains in social welfare is not guaranteed.  
An important case of limited risk-sharing is when a bad outcome decreases marginal 
utility, a property of the standard state-dependent model for valuing mortality risk described by 
expressions (12) and (13). In this case, it may be that some individuals could never be 
compensated for their loss, as suggested by Broome (1978). Marginal utilities may differ among 
people and BCA may not be a correct indicator of social welfare. Individual-specific information 
about mortality risks – whether lives are statistical or identified – may affect the result of BCA.  
We have studied some theoretical determinants of this difference. Let us summarize some 
results:  
1. The effects of information about interpersonal differences in the risk change due to a 
project depend on whether one evaluates the project using WTP or WTA measures.  
a. WTA, whether compensating variation for a risk increase (Section 4.1) or equivalent 
variation to forgo a risk decrease (Section 4.3), is larger with more information about 
heterogeneity of the risk change. Information about how the project affects individuals’ 
risks may lead to rejecting a risk-increasing project that would have been accepted (as in 
Broome’s paradox) or accepting a risk-decreasing project that would have been rejected 
with less information. In both cases, information about heterogeneity leads toward lower 
aggregate risk in the economy.   20
b. WTP, whether compensating variation for a risk decrease (Section 4.2) or equivalent 
variation to prevent a risk increase (Section 4.4), is smaller with more information about 
heterogeneity of the risk change. Information about how the project affects individuals’ 
risks may lead to rejecting a risk-decreasing project that would have been accepted and 
accepting a risk-increasing project that would have been rejected with less information. 
In both cases, information about heterogeneity leads toward higher aggregate risk in the 
economy. 
c. As a corollary, there is no necessary relationship between the extent to which risk 
changes are statistical or identifiable and the degree of protection endorsed by BCA.  
2. When baseline risks are heterogeneous, the effect of information on BCA is in general 
ambiguous. When individuals are risk neutral with respect to wealth more information about 
baseline risk can lead to increases in both types of compensating variation, i.e., WTP for a 
risk-decreasing policy and WTA for a risk-increasing policy, and can therefore lead to more 
protective decisions, yielding smaller aggregate risk. 
3. BCA does not explain the identifiable-victim effect, even with pure altruism. This is a 
consequence of a more general result that pure altruism need not be considered in BCA 
(Bergstrom, 2006). 
It is interesting to compare BCA with cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). In CEA, changes 
in health risk are often evaluated by the expected change in lives, life years, or quality-adjusted 
life years (QALYs) in the economy.
20 Evaluation of the effects of a program on mortality risk is 
unaffected by whether lives are statistical or identified or by information about heterogeneity of 
baseline risks or risk changes (holding constant population risk change as measured by the 
measure of effectiveness that is employed). This result is immediate since the expected change in 
effectiveness is linear in the probabilities. If individuals’ preferences for survival are consistent 
with expected life years or QALYs, CEA using these measures may be consistent with social 
                                                 
20 A QALY represents a year of life adjusted by an index of quality of life or health (Gold et al., 
1996; see Zeckhauser and Shepard (1976), Broome (1993), and Hammitt (2002) for economic 
discussions). The US Office of Management and Budget (2003) requires federal agencies to 
evaluate major regulations using CEA as well as BCA and an Institute of Medicine panel 
recommended that QALYs be used as the measure of effectiveness in this context (Miller et al., 
2006).   21
welfare maximization (Hammitt, 2002; Adler, 2006).
21 Hadorn (1996) reports that the 
insensitivity of the QALY approach to heterogeneity was criticized in the famous Oregon 
priority-setting exercise. The approach was perceived as yielding an ordering that undermined 
treatments for people facing life-threatening conditions, thus violating a preference for giving 
priority to identified victims.
22  
Overall, neither BCA nor CEA provide general support for prioritizing identified over 
anonymous lives in life-saving policies. Political factors are, however, natural candidates to 
explain such a prioritization.  
7.1 Political factors 
We discuss four political factors that may explain why statistical and identified lives are 
treated differently: responsibility, empathy, lobbying, and demagogy.
23 
First, it is important to recognize that persons with authority for safety decisions may have 
a responsibility to help identified people. In particular, there may be a legal responsibility.
24 By 
definition, the death of a victim identified ex post will be known and blame may be easily 
attributed to decision makers whereas the deaths of ex post anonymous individuals may be 
unnoticed or more difficult to attribute to particular decisions (Raiffa et al., 1977). Risk managers 
routinely set limits on the risks to which individuals may be exposed, often focusing on absolute 
risk levels (e.g., safety norms or standards). This practice may lead to protecting only highly 
exposed individuals and thus toward ex ante identifiable individuals. Notice that ex ante 
identification need not be restricted to those exposed to high risk. Providing greater protection to 
                                                 
21 Empirical evidence suggests that QALYs are not consistent with individual preferences. See, 
e.g., Pliskin et al. (1980), McNeil et al. (1981), and Bleichrodt and Johannesson (1994). 
22 Richardson and McKie (2003) give as an example that “dental caps for pulp or near pulp 
exposure were assigned a higher priority than surgical treatment for ectopic pregnancy.” Miller 
et al. (2006) evaluate the implications of QALYs for allocating risk reduction in a population.  
23 Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that individual-specific uncertainty may change the identity 
of the median voter and hence the projects that will be selected by majority vote. We do not 
address how this effect might be influenced by information about heterogeneity of risk. 
24 Richardson and McKie (2003), quoting Fried (1969: 1418), indicate that the director of a 
mining company refusing to spend money to save a trapped man may be civilly and criminally 
liable even if she has invested large sums of money to prevent such a catastrophe. Similar legal 
responsibilities may exist in hospitals, e.g., to care for terminally ill patients.   22
members of a minority or low-income group is a way to compensate them for other 
disadvantages,
25 consistent with environmental justice (Tietenberg, 1996). 
Second, decision makers may believe they have a special duty to help identified groups. 
Almost by definition, identified persons will be more salient to a decision maker who must target 
a specific policy objective. Empathy and vividness may also contribute. In contrast, decision 
makers may not appreciate that preoccupation with identified lives may contribute to “statistical 
murder.” They may prefer to base their policies on intuitive or emotional criteria rather than on 
BCA or CEA. They may be more willing to endorse perceived humane and caring policies and 
less willing to adopt policies that they perceive as unfair or unethical toward particular groups. 
This posture may be supported by their education or political agenda.  
Third, one may view society as composed of different groups of people, or lobbies, 
sharing common interests. Participants in small lobbies may have more intense interests and free 
riding may be less pronounced, yielding disproportionate political influence (Olson, 1971). A 
policy that favors concentrated interests may be more likely to be adopted than a policy that 
profits the mass but adversely affects a few. Similarly, the existence of a group that is particularly 
visible, e.g., through media exposure, may constitute a threat to politicians or firms with concerns 
about reputation. Visibility of a group may also be used to inform or manipulate the public. This 
practice may exert an indirect pressure on decision makers through ensuing changes in public 
beliefs (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). 
The last remark leads us to a fourth political factor, demagogy of politicians. Politicians 
might adopt policies that the public believes are good even when those policies are not 
necessarily good for the public. The public may prefer to reduce risk to identified victims because 
these induce a stronger emotional response (Jenni and Lowenstein, 1997). Identifying victims of 
a particular risk may also make that risk more salient and increase concern about one’s own 
exposure to it through the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), increasing 
demand for mitigation (Sunstein, 2005). This aspect may be aggravated if individuals 
                                                 
25 This practice is critically discussed by Viscusi (2000b). Note that a simple model of public 
provision of safety would actually predict quite an opposite result. According to this model, it is 
optimal to devote more resources to prevent risks faced by the sub-population of, say, richer 
people. Such a practice is efficient since it rests on the assumption that the government is also 
able to implement lump-sum transfers to redistribute income and finance the safety provision 
across the population. Richer people will be taxed more heavily to compensate poorer people so 
that, at the optimum, marginal utilities are equal.   23
misperceive the (marginal) costs of government services or favor government allocations based 
on ethical principles like equality (Kemp, 2003). 
7.2 Policy use of benefit-cost analysis  
We conclude by summarizing some remarks and raising additional concerns about the use 
of BCA for policy decisions.  
BCA using the standard VSL approach for valuing changes in mortality risk may not yield 
the same results as maximization of social welfare, defined as the mean of individual expected 
utilities. In particular, whereas social welfare may be unaffected by information about 
heterogeneity of baseline risk and of the magnitudes of policy-induced changes in risk, monetary 
measures of the risk change depend on baseline risk and risk change and so the value of a policy-
induced risk change may depend on information about risk heterogeneity. In contrast, the results 
of a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), which quantifies the effects of changes in mortality risk 
using lives saved, quality-adjusted life years, or other metrics, may be unaffected by information 
about risk heterogeneity. Hence if the effectiveness measure used in CEA is consistent with 
individuals’ preferences, the results of the analysis may be consistent with social-welfare 
maximization.  
Our results suggest there may be more opportunity for discretion and strategy in applying 
BCA as a policy tool when there is greater risk heterogeneity. Suppose that some actors 
concerned about a project possess information about risk heterogeneity. One can imagine that 
they may wish to release this information strategically so that the adoption rule matches their 
policy interest. The strategic value of information also provides incentives to obtain it. Similarly, 
when information is public and arrives exogenously, opportunistic actors may wish to accelerate 
or delay the decision-making process.  
Our findings may be useful in evaluating the intertemporal consistency of decisions based 
on BCA. An initial BCA may recommend adopting a project but additional information 
concerning unequal distribution of risk may reverse the recommendation. Information about 
heterogeneity of risk change usually favors the status quo. This suggests that an initial decision 
about whether to implement a project is unlikely to be reversed by a subsequent BCA conducted 
when more information is available, taking the early decision as the new status quo. This inertia, 
although reducing the possibility of Scitovsky switchings over time, may be socially inefficient.   24
CEA, which is usually unaffected by information about risk heterogeneity, may be less 
susceptible to such socially inefficient manipulations. 
A systematic premium for identified lives is not consistent with either BCA or CEA but 
may be explained by political and other factors such as symbolic support for individuals. Whether 
disproportionate allocation of resources toward programs that save identified lives is socially 
desirable depends in part on the moral legitimacy of those factors and on the magnitudes of the 
efficiency costs and other benefits.   25
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